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The impact of public news on return predictability following major one-day price or 
volume shocks: Evidence for Canada 
Siyu Duan 
 
This paper focuses on the stocks that experience large one-day price or volume movements in 
Canadian stock market and explores the relationship between the release of public news and the 
short-term post-event stock return predictability. First, I find that in general, large one-day price 
changes signal the following poor performance, while large volume increases predict good 
performance in the near future. Then I divide the samples into informed and uninformed events 
base on the presence of contemporary public news. I find that for both price and volume shocks, 
informed events tend to experience more price drifts than uninformed events. For stocks with 
negative initial price changes, informed events lead to price continuations while uninformed 
events are followed by price reversals. The results suggest that stock price patterns become more 
predictable after taking account of the availability of public news. Finally, a portfolio strategy 
suggests that investors can profit from the information conveyed jointly by the large price 
movement, abnormal trading volume and availability of public news, reflecting a violation of 
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Stock markets often show sudden and abnormal movements in price and volume. In a market 
with complete and instantaneous information, there should be an immediate revaluation in stock 
prices at the time of these movements. However, numerous studies of different markets and time 
periods have found that stock prices do not assimilate the unanticipated information immediately 
but continue to gravitate toward the new equilibriums after the external shocks, which present a 
violation of the efficient market hypothesis. As a result, there is evidence of systematic stock 
price continuations or reversals, suggesting that stock returns are predictable after large price or 
volume shocks.  
 
In this paper, I firstly examine the information content of sudden and unusual one-day price 
changes and trading activities. Several papers have studied the patterns of stock returns following 
extreme movements in price and volume. The contradictory results among these studies may be 
attributed to the variations in the markets, methodologies, model parameters and the time periods 
of investigation. The majority of the related studies investigate the U.S. stock markets. Many 
other significant markets have also been examined. But there is little research covering Canadian 
stock markets. Since each market has its own trading features which can also change over time, 
there might be quite different return patterns in different markets and during different time 
periods. In this paper, I focus on common stocks trading on Toronto Stock Exchange for the 
latest years from 2011 to 2014. I find that on average, in a 20-day period, stocks earn negative 
excess returns following extreme price movements and positive excess returns following large 
volume increases regardless of the directions of the initial price changes. This seems to imply 
that in general, large one-day price changes tend to signal the following poor performance, while 
unusual increases in volume predict good performance in the near future. I also find that the 
magnitude and trend of the price patterns differ across industries. 
 
The main objective of this paper is to examine how public announcements affect stock return 
patterns following large price or trading volume movements. In addition to the conflicting results, 
there is also much disagreement about what contributes to stock price continuation or reversal. 
The reactions of stock prices to external shocks may depend on several factors, including 
macroeconomic environment, market conditions and firm-specific characteristics. Since public 
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news disseminates new information broadly among investors, it may be an important 
determinant of return predictability.  
 
My basic approach is straightforward. I first identify firms’ major price and trading volume 
movements and then explore for the public news that might drive such movements. Non-
availability of public announcements may be due to several reasons, including private 
information among insiders, liquidity shocks, shifts in investor sentiment, and significant 
changes in macroeconomic or industry-wide factors. Since I focus on the significant price and 
volume movements, only price-sensitive and value-relevant information is examined.  
 
My hypothesis is motivated by two stock market anomalies from the finance literature: post-
news stock price drifts and pure stock price reversals. I combine these two phenomena and test 
the joint hypothesis that investors respond differently to large price and trading volume 
movements accompanied by public announcements and to other movements without publicized 
reasons. By examining daily price adjustments following the events up to 20 days, I find 
evidence supporting this hypothesis. The price patterns become more predictable after taking 
account of the availability of public news. Specifically, when sudden and abnormal changes in 
price and volume are accompanied by news disclosure, stock prices continue to move in the 
direction of the initial price changes. While when there is no publicized reason for the shocks, 
stock prices tend to move in the opposite directions. Investors seem to underreact to news about 
fundamentals but overreact to other shocks that cause unusual stock price changes and trading 
activities. These post-event return patterns are more pronounced for stocks with negative initial 
price changes.  
 
Next, I apply a regression analysis to reassess whether the subsequent market reactions to price 
and volume shocks are conditioned on the release of public information after controlling for 
other factors. The results confirm that information availability determines post-event 
performance, but mostly for volume events. Additionally, initial price change, firm size, pre-
event information leakage, volatility of stock returns and past stock price and volume also affect 




Finally, I test whether investors can profit from the different market responses to information and 
no-information based price and volume shocks by focusing on the losers sample (Stocks with 
negative abnormal returns on day 0). A possible portfolio strategy is proposed and analyzed. The 
results show that the portfolio profits are positive after taking into account transaction costs. The 
abnormal returns are not only statistically significant but also economically meaningful 
 
To summarize, in this paper, I take a fresh look at of the return predictability following major 
price and volume shocks. In the process, the study contributes to the existing researches in 
several ways. First, previous studies which examine the stock behavior after significant price or 
trading volume movements do not identify whether such movements are driven by firm-specific 
news and therefore draw different conclusions. In this paper, I partition the events based on the 
availability of public news. This method provides a greater understanding of the underlying 
reasons for the abnormal stock activities. Second, in much of the literature, how large price or 
volume changes are defined as extreme shocks is arbitrarily. Most studies rely on an absolute 
trigger value. In this paper, I concentrate only on the extremes of the return and trading volume 
distributions. I examine unexpected changes in price and volume measured by deviations from 
their expectations. Since the nature of the findings may depend on the size of the initial price and 
volume movements, this study might come to different conclusions from previous studies. Third, 
empirical researches traditionally only use unexpected price changes to measure the information 
content of public announcements, whereas the trading volume has been studied less frequently. 
The change in price reflects only the average change in traders' beliefs, whereas trading volume 
contains the differences among traders. The evidence from the extant literature indicates that 
trading volume increases at the time when public news is released. Therefore, in my study, both 
price reaction and trading volume activity accompanied by public announcements are examined. 
Fourth, the study of information-based events in this paper sheds some new light on the 
information content of public announcements. Although the relationship between public 
information disclosures and the post-event stock returns has been well investigated with event 
study methodology, limited prior work distinguish the public information which are value-
relevant and which convey no new information. Not all reported news is unanticipated and price 
or trading volume sensitive. In this paper, I adopt a novel methodology by first identifying firms’ 
abnormal price or trading volume movements and then exploring for the news that might drive 
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such movements. Thus, it allows me to focus only on the economically significant news that are 
of most relevance to investors without being constrained by an a priori determined set of 
information events. Finally, studies of extreme price changes and trading activities could provide 
insights into several related streams of finance research. For example, literatures on momentum 
effects, asymmetric information, behavioral bias and liquidity effects all deal with similar issues 
in a variety of contexts. In broad terms, all these literatures document and seek to explain 
predictable movements in asset prices which may violate the weak form of the efficient market 
hypothesis. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 
develops the testable hypothesis. Section 4 defines the variables and outlines the methodology. 
Section 5 describes the sample data and presents the empirical results. Section 6 tests the profits 
of a possible trading strategy. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
Large price change, trading volume and public announcement capture the three major 
characteristics of information signal: magnitude, precision and dissemination (Pritamani and 
Singal, 2001). These three signal-identifying proxies jointly predict future returns and have 
received considerable attention in the literature. 
 
2.1 Studies on large price changes 
Many papers have investigated the behavior of stock prices following large one-day price 
movements. While there is evidence suggesting that returns are indeed predictable subsequent to 
extreme price changes, the results are contradictory and there is no agreement about the 
underlying reasons for this predictability. Mainly three categories of explanations have been 
proposed: over- or under-reaction hypothesis, uncertain information hypothesis and the influence 
of market microstructure (Amini et al., 2013). Support for these hypotheses can be found in 
several studies.  
 
One of the most influential papers is by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) who study long-term return 
anomalies and first formally state stock market overreaction hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests 
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that investors respond too strongly to the release of information. Extreme movements in stock 
prices are followed by price reversals to “correct” the initial temporary overreation. In contrast to 
the overreaction hypothesis, underreaction hypothesis postulates that investors do not respond 
strongly enough to information. The slow incorporation of news into prices causes stock prices 
to move in the same direction of the initial price change. 
 
Brown et al. (1988) use a one-day price trigger of 2.5% to identify winners and losers for 200 of 
the largest firms in the S&P 500 during the period 1962 through 1985. They find that the 
cumulative average abnormal returns following the extreme price changes are positive and 
statistically significant for both winners and losers. They attribute the results to the response of 
market participants to changing risk. According to their uncertain information hypothesis, 
investors initially underprice stocks when confronted with new information (unfavorable or 
favorable) in order to compensate for uncertainty. As the uncertainty is resolved, stock prices rise 
to their post-event intrinsic values. 
 
Cox and Peterson (1994) investigate short-term stock return behavior following one-day price 
declines of 10 percent or more over a twenty-day period. They find that most of the reversals are 
due to the bid-ask spread. Akhigbe et al. (1998) find a relationship existing between the size of 
the reversal and the size of the bid–ask spread. These findings support the hypothesis that bid–
ask bounce is significant in explaining the reversal pattern. A large one-day price increase 
(decline) is likely to be associated with the closing transaction at ask (bid) price due to 
substantial buying (selling) pressure. However, the stock has an equal chance of closing at bid or 
ask price the next day and thus cause spurious negative serial correlation in stock prices due to 
the bid-ask bounce. 
 
2.2 Studies on trading volume 
As Beaver (1968) points out, an important distinction between the price and volume is that the 
former reflects changes in the expectations of the market as a whole while the latter reflects 
changes in the expectations of individual investors. Bajo (2010) states that trading volume is an 
efficient proxy for information flow and plays an important role in information based models 
where prices alone are unable to provide full information about the magnitude and precision of 
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news signals. The information based models have been developed with heterogeneous investors 
and an incomplete asset market. In these models, information trading stems from heterogeneous 
expectations among traders over the revised value of the firm after a public announcement is 
released. The disagreements among traders can arise either because they have different private 




The literature on stock trading volume is extensive. There are many empirical studies on the 
relation between volume and price changes. Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Harris and Raviv 
(1993) investigate theoretically how the price and volume reactions to a public announcement 
are related to each other and find that absolute price changes and volume are positively 
correlated. Conrad et al. (1994) find price reversals following increases in volume and price 
continuations following low volume over weekly horizons. By examining the dynamic relation 
between volume and prices, Wang (1994) studies how the nature of investor heterogeneity 
determines the behavior of asset prices. He finds that volume is always positively correlated with 
absolute price changes and the correlation increases with information asymmetry. Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000) find evidence that a volume-based strategy of buying past high-volume 
winners and selling past high-volume losers outperforms the traditional momentum strategy  
over intermediate horizons. They also advance momentum life cycle (MLC) hypothesis which 
presents the interaction between price momentum, reversals, and trading volume in a single 
framework.  
 
Many studies distinguish only between high and low volume stocks. But in order to fully address 
the potential informative role of volume, it is important to understand the effect of unusual 
trading activities relative to normal activities. Gervais et al. (2001) investigate whether extreme 
trading activity contains information about the future evolution of stock prices. They find that 
stocks experiencing unusually high (low) trading volume over a day or a week tend to appreciate 
                                                        
1 Kim and Verrecchia (1991) assume that traders are diversely informed and differ in the precision of their 
private prior information. Therefore, they respond differently to the public news, which leads to positive 
volume. However, in the models of Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) and Harris and Raviv (1993), traders 
share common prior beliefs and receive common information but differ in the way in which they interpret the 
information. As a result, trading is generated by differences of opinion among traders. 
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(depreciate) over the following month. This high-volume return premium is consistent with the 
hypothesis that trading volume shocks could affect the subsequent demand and stock prices. 
Zheng (2007) argue that unusual trading volume has different implications for past winner and 
loser stocks. Specifically, high trading volume for losers is driven by purchases made by 
informed investors; while high trading volume for winners could be driven by either information 
or representativeness bias or both. Another study is by Bajo (2010) who examines the 
information content of abnormal trading volumes. He finds excess returns in a three-day window 
around abnormal trading but transaction costs can make most of the theoretical gains disappear. 
He concludes that information filters slowly into prices and there is a positive relation between 
abnormal trading volume and excess returns. 
 
2.3 Studies on public news 
It is apparent that financial markets usually respond to the release of relevant information. To 
measure the market response at the time of public announcements, most studies examine the 
post-event price reactions. It is generally agreed that unexpected price changes imply that an 
announcement alters investors' beliefs and thus contains information. However, evidences have 
shown that trading volume also responds to public news. One influential related study is by 
Beaver (1968), who finds that trading volume increases at the time of earnings announcements. 
Therefore, it is incomplete to interpret price change as a solely measure of information. 
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) provide an economic rationale for examining both price and 
volume effects at the time of information releases. They identify an informedness effect and a 
consensus effect of the information. These two effects generally occur jointly when information 
is disseminated and affect both the variance of unexpected price changes and trading volume. 
Therefore, they conclude that studies of unexpected price changes or volume are equally relevant 
means of assessing information content. 
 
Most literature examining stock price behavior around public announcements suggests that the 
release of public news is an important determinant of return predictability. But the strength of the 
relation between publicly available information and market activity is questioned. Roll (1988) 
finds that for individual firms, a model that includes aggregate economic developments, industry 
effects, and firm-specific news explains only a fraction of daily and monthly return variance.  
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Cutler et al. (1989) suggest that macroeconomic variables explain less than half of the variance 
in aggregate stock prices, and large market movements often do not coincide with new 
information. Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) also state that the relation between news reported in 
the financial press and stock returns and trading volume activity is not particularly strong. 
 
The objective of this paper is to determine how the availability of public news affects returns 
subsequent to large price and volume movements. My research approach is most similar to those 
of Pritamani and Singal (2001), Chan (2003), Larson and Madura (2003) and Savor (2012). The 
results from these studies show that the degree of price continuation or reversal depends on 
whether there is an announcement that explains the underlying reason for the shocks. But all of 
these researches focus on U.S. stock markets and none of them investigates the role of public 
announcements on stock behaviors after extreme volume increases which I believe is also 
important and will examine in this study. 
 
Overall, there have been extensive researches on stock return predictability conditional on large 
price changes, trading volume or public announcement. But few of them combine these three 




3.1 Impact of public news on price shocks 
Release of public news may reduce the uncertainty and be an important determinant of return 
predictability following extreme stock price changes. On one hand, there is substantial evidence 
of short-term stock price continuation which is often attributed to a gradual market response to 
public announcements. Many event studies find that investors are slow to respond to valid 
information about fundamentals demonstrated by significant post-event abnormal returns. On the 
other hand, short-term price reversal in the stock market is also a well-established phenomenon. 
Evidence shows that investors overreact to pure price shocks caused by private information, 
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Several behavioral models attempt to explain how investors react to new information and predict 
that investors respond differently according to the availability of public news. Daniel et al. (1998) 
use overconfidence and biased self-attribution to model investor behavior. They postulate that 
stock price underreact to public information but overreact to private information. Barberis at al. 
(1998) built a behavior model based on conservatism bias and representativeness bias, and argue 
that conservatism bias causes investors to update their priors insufficiently when they observe 
new public information about a firm. Hong and Stein (1999) define two types of traders: news 
watchers, who trade only on private information about fundamentals, and momentum traders, 
who trade only on past price movements. News watchers usually underreact to news as 
information moves gradually across them, whereas momentum traders tend to overreact to non-
information based price movements. Based on these behavior models and previous empirical 
evidence, the first hypothesis to be tested in this paper is the following: 
 
Stock price behavior after extreme price movements is related to the release of public 
information that explains the underlying reason. Price shocks accompanied by public news are 
followed by price drifts while those unaccompanied by public news result in price reversals.  
 
3.2 Impact of public news on volume shocks 
Trading activity reflects changes in the heterogeneous expectations of individual investors or 
differential interpretations on the news release. According to semi-strong market efficiency, 
when new information flows into the market, an increase in volume is just the resulting effect of 
informed trades and provides no additional information. However, in reality, abnormal trading 
activities do not always happen simultaneously with public announcements. There could be 
substantial trading without any news release. Since the behavior of prices crucially depends on 
                                                        
2
 Da at al. (2014) find that both liquidity shocks and investor sentiment contribute to the observed short-term 
reversal, but in different ways: Liquidity shocks are more likely to explain the reversal on recent losers, 
whereas investor sentiment, combined with short-sale constraint, are more important for explaining the 
reversals on recent winners. 
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the nature of investor heterogeneity, trading volume conveys important information about how 
assets are priced in the market.  
 
Unusual trading activity could be driven by information trading, momentum chasing or liquidity 
demand. Different causes of abnormal trading activity may result in different stock price 
performance afterwards. Trades are information generated if the informed investors trade when 
they receive new information about the stock's future cash flow. Under asymmetric information, 
investors update their expectations differently in response to public information. As a result, 
public news generates abnormal trading. If new information is incorporated in prices slowly over 
time, the price doesn’t fully adjust to reflect the new information immediately and the strategic 
trading by informed traders will lead to price continuations. Since the trade is information-based, 
price will not reverse in the long term. However, noninformational trading could lead to different 
stock price patterns. Campbell et al. (1993) find that because of the price pressure caused by 
portfolio rebalancing, volume increases due to liquidity trading without the release of new 
information would lead to subsequent price reversals as compensation for those who provide 
liquidity. Trading activities based on momentum chasing could also result in price reversals. 
Momentum chasers tend to temporarily push the stock price higher or lower than its intrinsic 
value and this behavioral bias will be corrected finally. According to the analysis above, I 
hypothesis: 
 
Large increases in volume can convey information to the market and predict the evolution 
process of stock prices. Post-event return patterns depend on whether the trading volume shocks 
are accompanied by public news. The release of contemporary public information is a necessary 
condition for price continuation. 
 
3.3 Other influential factors 
I hypothesize that the magnitude of the under- or overreaction to major price and volume shocks 
also depends on the following factors: 
 
Initial price change 
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According to the overreaction hypothesis, price reversal in stock returns reflects the overreaction 
of investors to the disclosure of unexpected information. Greater overreaction would lead to 
greater corrections. So it is expected that the initial price movements are negatively related to the 
subsequent stock returns in the post-event period. 
 
Firm size 
Cox and Peterson (1994) find evidence that small firms experience larger price reversals than 
large firms. However, when the bid-ask bounce element is removed, no size effect remains. They 
suggest that size may be more closely proxy for bid-ask spreads than for other liquidity-based 
factors. Chan (2003) finds that news drift and no-news reversal are stronger for smaller firms. He 
concludes that drifts and reversals are related to ease of trading, liquidity, attention, institutional 
ownership, or other factors related to size. Benou and Richie (2003) examine the long-run 
reversal pattern for a sample of large firms and conjecture that since the market for large firms is 
generally more liquid, investors should possess high quality and superior information about such 
firms in which case investors’ reactions to firm-specific news should hardly be an overreaction. 
On the other hand, small firms are not monitored as closely by market participants as larger firms 
and therefore subject to larger degree of error when the market re-evaluates their stock prices in 
response to new information. In light of these findings, it is expected that the degree of reversal 
will be larger for small firms. 
 
Stock return volatility 
The volatility of the stock returns reflects the degree to which investor sentiment or liquidity 
shocks affect trading activity in the stock. Hirshleifer (2001) posits that the greater uncertainty 
about stocks leave more room for psychological biases. Daniel et al. (1998) further argue that 
investors tend to be more overconfident when firms’ businesses are hard to value. Firms with 
higher stock return volatility are associated with a higher degree of uncertainty and therefore 
larger degrees of error when investors re-evaluate share prices. Therefore, it is possible that firms 





Information leakage suggests that traders are trading on private information. According to Daniel 
et al. (1998), investors are overconfident about the precision of private information, causing 
stock prices to overreact. So pre-event leakage is hypothesized to be positively related to the 
level of overreaction. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1 Sample selection 
The initial sample consists of all common stocks listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange from 
2011 to 2014. Previous studies have found evidence that market microstructure effects may 
contribute to the observed price pattern. The price reversal after extreme price change may only 
reflect oscillation between bid and ask price. Since the bid–ask bounce mostly affects small and 
illiquid stocks, stocks with the annually average prices less than $10 are eliminated from the 
sample. However, Cox and Peterson (1994) find that the bid-ask bounce effect still exists even 
after excluding low-price stocks. To lessen the bias, I calculate stock prices as the mid-point of 
closing bid and ask prices. The stock price data are obtained from CFMRC database. This 
database contains both closing prices and bid-ask prices for stocks traded on TSX. In order to 
ensure the reliability of the findings, I check for the correctness of the data, requiring the bid-ask 
price not equal to zero and ask price higher than bid price. Missing and erroneous bid-ask prices 
are replaced with closing prices. For each year, I eliminate the firm if its share price or trading 
volume data is not available for more than 250 trading days in that year and one year before. The 
requirement for the data of previous year is to derive appropriate benchmarks for the abnormal 
return and volume models. 
 
4.2 Identifying extreme price movements and major trading activities 
A large abnormal price change is called a price event. The definition of a large price change is 
somewhat arbitrary and therefore varies across the existing literature. Most papers rely on an 
absolute trigger value and define a daily return of 10% or more to be an extreme price movement. 
However, an absolute threshold is likely to be biased in favor of selecting highly volatile stocks. 
To avoid this problem, I use returns scaled by volatilities. A price event is defined if market 
adjusted abnormal return is more than three standard deviations away from the mean, based on 
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mean and standard deviation calculated over the preceding 200 days (-205,-6) for that stock.
3
 
Pritamani and Singal (2001) use the same selection methods and they believe that this criterion is 
more appropriate since abnormal price change is a proxy for the significant change in investor 
expectations. These returns are in the extreme tails of the return distributions and accounting for 
approximately the largest 1% of price movements. This threshold should be high enough to 
reflect substantial changes in market perception and is likely to be associated with firm specific 
news releases. All of the events are between January 2011 and November 2014. The December 
of 2014 is reserved for examining the post-event price movements.  
 
An extreme level of daily trading volume is called a volume event. Since raw trading volume is 
likely to be highly correlated with firm size, I use daily turnover as a measure of the trading 
volume, calculated as the ratio of the number of shares traded each day to the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of that day. An abnormal volume event is the extreme deviation from what 
can be considered standard trading activity. Following Bajo (2010), I use normalized abnormal 





Where 𝑇𝑉𝑖,𝑡  is trading volume for stock i on day t; 𝜇𝑖,𝑡  and 𝜎𝑖,𝑡  are the mean and standard 
deviation of trading volume in the preceding 66 days. The threshold for volume events is set to 
NAV equal to 3. To ensure that the increase in volume is not caused by a change in the number 
of shares outstanding, I exclude the event if the shares outstanding changes greater than 1% on 
the event day or the preceding 60 trading days. 
 
After identifying all the abnormal price and volume shocks, I further screen the events based on 
the following criteria: First, to avoid multiple events in the same time period for the same firm 
being included, I select observations with no large price or volume movement over the preceding 
20 trading days of the price and volume events respectively. Second, I require the stock to be 
traded on each of the 60 days preceding the event day to avoid the infrequent trading problem, 
and on each of the 20 days following the event day to investigate after-event price behavior. 
Finally, I classify both the price and volume events into two subsamples based on the direction 
                                                        
3
 A minimum of 180 non-missing observations is required to calculate the mean and standard deviation. 
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of the price change on the event day: winners and losers. To minimize cross-sample correlation, 
only one event per trading day is included in each sample. For either sample, the events are 
sorted first by date and then alphabetically by firm name. Only the observation appearing first in 
the alphabetic sort for that day is retained.  
 
4.3 Calculation of post-event abnormal returns 
To control for the bid-ask bounce, I calculate stock returns based on the mid-point of closing bid-
ask prices adjusted for dividends. Abnormal return is calculated as a firm’s daily return in excess 
of its return predicted by market model.
4
 Market model parameters are estimated from 205 
through 6 trading days prior to the event day. Average abnormal returns are calculated as the 
sum of the individual stock abnormal returns for that day divided by the number of observations. 
I also calculate the proportion of stocks with positive abnormal returns and test whether it is 
significantly different from 0.5. Results are reported for various periods up to 20 days following 
an event. 
 
4.4 Availability of public information  
To examine the impact of public information, I classify both the return and volume events into 
two groups based on whether they are accompanied by contemporary news disclosure: the 
informed events and uninformed events. Most of previous studies use public news as a proxy for 
the presence of public information (Pritamani and Singal 2001, Chan 2003, Larson and Madura 
2003). Whereas Savor (2012) uses analyst reports to identify news-based events. He suggests 
that analyst reports focus more on news about fundamentals and their content is more relevant to 
investors. For my study, I search for firm-specific news in the publications to distinguish 
informed and uninformed events. Since public news is timely available to the broadest investors, 
I believe it is a more appropriate proxy for the release of public information and will not bias the 
results. 
 
To capture the public news driving significant price and volume movements, I use the 
EUREKA.CC database to search for any firm-specific news. This database provides full text 
                                                        
4 Previous researches (Peterson,1995; Pritamani, 2001; Bajo, 2010; Savor, 2012) have shown that the results do 
not depend on the choice of a particular asset pricing model. 
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access to regional and local Canadian newspapers in both English and French, as well as other 
formats such as newswires, specialized periodicals, and radio and television transcripts. I select 
only those news sources with coverage of topics in finance and economics, publicized daily or 
continuously, distributed nationwide, and available in electronic format in database for the whole 
sample period. The resulting list of news sources includes Canadian Press (Presse canadienne), 
Marketwired (English and French) and Canada NewsWire (English and French). These sources 
have a complete coverage across time and firms in Canada.  
 
I employ a 2-day window to search for news. It comprises the event day (t=0) and the 
immediately preceding day (t=-1) to account for news release after trading hours and short-term 
delays in the market’s reaction.5 An event is classified as informed if there is at least one piece of 
firm-specific news publicized. This simple definition does not distinguish different forms of 
public information, thus avoiding selection bias. 
 
4.5 Regression model 
The regression analysis provides a framework for testing the importance of public news on the 
price evolution process after controlling for other possible influential factors. The effects of 
initial price change, firm size, pre-event information leakage, volatility of stock returns and past 
stock price and volume are also examined. Control variables are included to account for month-
of-the-year and day-of-the-week effects. The following model is separately applied to the sample 
of winners and losers or both price and volume events. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑚,𝑛) = β0 + β1𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖 + β2𝐴𝑅0𝑖 + β3 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + β4 𝐿𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑖 + β5 𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖 + β6 𝑆𝐷𝑖 + β7 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑖
+ β8𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑉𝑖 + β9MON + β10JAN + β11DEC + ε 
Where 
CARi(m,n) = the cumulative abnormal return for firm i over a period starting m and ending n 
trading days after the event day; 
UNDi = a dummy variable equals to one if no news is published for firm i on the event day or 
one day before, and zero otherwise; 
                                                        
5 Since the stock market is closed on weekends, if the event occurs on Monday, I will broaden the search 
window back to the last Friday. 
16 
 
AR0i = the abnormal return for firm i on the event day; 
SIZEi = the percentile ranking of firm i based on the firm’s market value of equity calculated six 
days before the event day; 
LEAKi = the abnormal return for firm i on the day before the event day; 
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖 = the normalized abnormal volume for firm i on the event day; 
SDi = the standard deviation of firm i’s returns over trading days 205 through 6 before the event 
day;  
AvgRi = the average of firm i’s returns over trading days 205 through 6 before the event day;  
AvgVi =  the average daily turnover of firm i over previous 66 trading days of the event; 
MON = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the event occurred on Monday, and zero otherwise; 
JAN = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the event occurred in January, and zero otherwise; 
DEC = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the event occurred in December, and zero otherwise. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Data description 
There are 302 firms in the whole sample. The distribution of the industries among the sample 
firms are presented in Table 1. Since the firms are drawn from 20 different stock market sectors, 
a single industry should not dominate the analysis. With the requirement of stock price greater 
than 10$, no stock lies in the bottom quintile of TSX. Therefore, it is unlikely that small firms 
derive the results in this paper.  
 
Table 2 and Figure 1 presents the time-series distribution of events. There is no obvious 
intertemporal trend or clustering effect which may bias the results. The events are classified 
according to the direction of initial price change and the availability of public news. Some 
summary statistics for each subsample are presented in Table 3. 
 
5.1.1 Comparison of price events versus volume events 
Table 3 shows that there are about half of the price changes accompanied by public news, while 
there are more uninformed volume events than informed ones, with the ratio of the former to the 
latter being close to 2:1. This seems to suggest that large price change is a more informative 
signal for detecting new information about fundamentals than abnormal trading volume. Not 
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surprisingly, price events have more significant abnormal returns while volume events have 
higher abnormal volumes on the event day. The other variables are quite the same among price 
and volume events. 
 
5.1.2 Comparison of winners versus losers 
For large one-day price movements, there are more winners than losers for both informed and 
uninformed events. The magnitude of the average positive abnormal returns is smaller than that 
of the negative ones. The abnormal volume associated with a price increase generally exceeds 
that with a price decrease, perhaps due to the short selling restrictions. The winners and losers 
are quite different in terms of most firm characteristics. In general, winners tend to be smaller, 
have lower prices and perform worse than losers in the past. For stocks experiencing major 
trading volume movements, the numbers of winners and losers are almost the same. Winners on 
average have larger event day abnormal returns in absolute value and are accompanied by lower 
abnormal volumes. 
 
5.1.3 Comparison of informed events versus uninformed events 
Consistent with previous literature showing that publicly available information cannot fully 
explain stock market movements, only 52 % of major price changes and 35 % of major volume 
movements are accompanied by firm specific news. The informed events, assumed to be driven 
by firms’ fundamental information, are accompanied by more extreme stock returns on the event 
day than the uninformed ones. 
 
Measured by market equity, firms with information-based price and volume movements are 
larger than no-information ones. This finding suggests that public news is a more influential 
factor for large stocks, whereas private signals or shifts in investor sentiment are more important 
for smaller stocks. The possible explanation is that financial press is usually prone to report 
developments affecting larger companies, while smaller stocks have less information available 




5.2 Unconditional post-event returns 
Table 4 and 5 present the average daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for 
the sample of price and volume events respectively. The abnormal returns for days from −3 to −1 
are used to determine whether there is leakage of information. Various intervals are examined 
over a 20-day time horizon after the events. The proportions of positive abnormal returns are also 
presented.  
 
In the price events sample, both winners and losers experience negative cumulative abnormal 
returns over the twenty-day period following the event. Generally, winners experience reversals 
whereas losers are followed by additional stock price decreases. This finding doesn’t support the 
uncertain information hypothesis which predicts positive abnormal returns after extreme stock 
price increases and decrease. The results suggest that the market is overoptimistic when 
evaluating stocks in reposes to favorable and unfavorable information. Large one-day price 
changes in either direction signal the beginning of a period of relatively poor performance. 
However, we should notice that the negative CARs for losers are mostly driven by the excess 
return on day 1 and that an insignificant reversal actually takes place since day 2. Prior to the 
event day, excess returns are in the same direction as the initial price change on day 0 and 
statistically significant on day -1. This may be an effect of information leakage. This effect 
seems to be more pronounced for losers since they have more extreme pre-event abnormal 
returns. Among the literature in this research area, most studies find reversals for both winners 
and losers (e.g., Corrado, 1997; Park, 1995; Akhigbe et al. 1998). But this does not directly 
contradict my results since the nature of the findings may depend on the size of the initial price 
move. The large movements examined in this paper are smaller than the 10% minimum reported 
in previous literature and this raises the possibility that the results may be different. 
 
The results for volume events are quite the opposite. Stock prices rise after extreme volume 
activities for both winners and losers. The abnormal returns are persistent beyond the event day 
and significant for winners. This suggests that abnormal trading volume contains information not 
yet reflected in prices. The return patterns imply that unconditional large volume increases seem 




Table 6 presents the average abnormal returns for three subsamples based on industry 
classification. The three main industries are mining, finance and insurance, and manufacturing. 
There are 159 firms from these three sectors, accounting for more than half of the whole samples 
(0.53%). Figure 2 displays the CARs for the three subsamples as well as the whole sample 
starting from day -3 to day 5. The graphs clearly show the large movements in price and the 
subsequent drift or reversal process. The magnitude and trend of the price patterns differ across 
industries. On the event day of large price or volume shocks, manufacturing and mining stocks 
experience much greater abnormal returns than the finance and insurance sector. This finding 
suggests that finance and insurance firms are much less volatile. In the subsequent 5 days period, 
finance and insurance stocks exhibit the largest and strongest reversal pattern after extreme price 
movements. Mining industry stocks reverse most after abnormal volume increases, largely 
consistent with the overreaction hypothesis which predicts the more extreme initial price 
movements followed by the greater reversals. Akhigbe et al. (2002) and Benou and Richie (2003) 
also find variations among different industries. They argue that the different levels of uncertainty 
associated with each industry lead to differences in the investors’ reactions. 
 
5.3 Impact of public news 
Previous analyses examine the return predictability with no regard to the presence of 
contemporaneous news. To examine the impact of public news, I divide the sample based on its 
information status. Results for price and volume events are presented in Tables 7 and 8 
respectively. I also calculate the differences of abnormal returns for informed and uninformed 




5.3.1 Evidence from price events 
The informed winners earn insignificant positive abnormal returns over days 1 through 5. But 
these positive abnormal returns are more than reversed over days 6 through 20 which result in 
negative 20-day CARs. Uninformed winners subsequently earn negative abnormal returns which 
                                                        
6 Since I have exclude low price stocks from the sample and calculate stock returns based on bid-ask average, 
bid-ask bounce should not be the cause of observed reversal patterns. The methods of measuring abnormal 
returns should not be the reason for any difference between losers and winners or between informed and 
uninformed events, because the abnormal returns are derived in the same manner for all categories. 
20 
 
last up to 20 days. This finding, along with the return patterns documented in Table 4, suggests 
that large one-day price increases signal, after a possible brief recovery, the beginning of a 
period of relative poor performance. Much of the initial price change might be a result of 
investors’ overreaction. For negative price shocks, the informed losers earn negative cumulative 
abnormal returns of -0.664% over 5 days, while the uninformed ones earn positive cumulative 
abnormal returns of 0.217%. But these patterns get a little bit reversed through day 6 to 20. The 
differences of abnormal returns for informed and uninformed events are more statistically large 
for losers than for winners. Figures 3 provides a more detailed view of the continued drift 
experienced by informed events in contrast with the reversal pattern experienced by uninformed 
events. 
 
Short-term stock price continuation is often attributed to investor behavioral biases such as 
investor underreaction to new information. However, the results above indicate that there is 
distinction between informed winners and informed losers. Stocks seem to primarily underreact 
to unfavorable news. There is an asymmetric response to public information. There are two 
possible reasons which can help explain this asymmetric drift pattern. The first is that informed 
traders are more willing to take long positions than short positions in stocks or they simply have 
different attitudes to favorable and unfavorable news. They form incorrect expectations about 
future performance of the firms and mostly underreact to unfavorable news. Another explanation 
is that stock exchanges and regulators often impose restrictions on short selling, which prevents 
information, particularly bad news, from being incorporated into the stock price.  
 
Overall, considering winners and losers collectively, the differential responses to news and no-
news price shocks is broadly consistent with the hypothesis that large price changes 
accompanied by information are followed by drifts while no-information ones result in reversals 
over the immediately following periods. Previous studies which also examine large stock returns 
conditional on whether they are driven by public information all find similar results. These 
papers are generally similar in the overall approach but different in the detailed research design 
compared with mine. For example, Chan (2003) focuses on the monthly data. Larson and 
Madura (2003) examine price movements of 10% or more. Savor (2012) uses recommendation-




5.3.2 Evidence from volume events 
Table 8 presents the abnormal returns around extreme trading activities. Results for informed 
events reveal how stock market reacts to news in a setting of large trading volume. The existence 
of high volume enhances the precision of the related signal and makes the empirical findings 
more reliable. Results for uninformed events reveal the information role of extreme trading 
volume without disclosed public information. 
 
The results show that market reaction largely occurs on the event day, simultaneously with large 
volume. But the price adjustment is not instantaneous to its full informative level on the event 
day. Information presence appears to be a key determinant of post-event performance. After 
price increases, the average cumulative abnormal return over a 20-day horizon is 1.127% if it is 
information-based and 0.081% if it is not. Although the large volume increases accompanied by 
information disclosure exhibit a stronger market reaction, excess returns still persist when no 
public information is contemporaneously released. Informed winners outperform uninformed 
ones and the return differences are statistically large. This pattern is reversed for losers. The 
average 20-day cumulative abnormal return after price declines is -0.745% if it is information 
based and 0.432% if it is not. Actually the uninformed losers experience price reversals. There is 
evidence of overreaction for losers when information is not publicized at the time of the volume 
shocks. The different stock price patterns between informed and uninformed volume events are 
more clearly observed from Figures 4. 
 
In conclusion, the results confirm the hypothesis that post-event returns depend on whether the 
trading volume shocks are accompanied by public news. The difference in return predictability 
between informed and uninformed events implies that release of information is a necessary 
condition for price continuation. These results are not consistent with the findings of Bajo (2010) 
which show that both informed and uninformed sample experience price continuation after large 





5.3.3 A broader definition of public news 
In the previous analysis, I define informed events as the large price or volume movements 
accompanied by firm-specific news. Thus, these events are assumed to be driven by firms’ 
fundamental information. However, company news only account for part of the publicly 
available information. The non-availability of public announcements for the remaining 
uninformed events may be due to significant movements in macroeconomic factors. Although 
macroeconomic news might be less relevant to firms’ future prospect, it can still attract the 
investors’ attention. So next I will reclassify the informed and uninformed events based on a 
broader definition of public news, including both company and macroeconomic news. This 
division results in more informed events and less uninformed events. 
 
In Table 9 and 10, I present the results for the informed and uninformed events with the broader 
definition of news. The same general stock return patterns persist. But compared with Table 7 
and 8, the informed events experience less extreme abnormal returns on the event day and less 
price drifts afterwards. This suggests that investors underreact less to economic news, despite 
such information might be less relevant for firms’ future performance. The unformed events 
exhibit higher post-events abnormal returns for both winner and losers. Because of the difficulty 
in associating macroeconomic news with the observed stock movements, I might mix some 
informed events with uninformed events. So the return differences between the two groups are 
smaller with the broader definition of news. Overall, the stock return patterns observed in 
previous analysis are robust to other definitions of news.  
 
5.4 Cross-sectional analysis 
A cross-sectional analysis can test more rigorously whether information presence affects post-
event returns and examine the effects of other relevant factors. Coefficients from the estimation 
of equation (1) for each subsample are presented in Table 9 and 10 for price and volume events 
respectively. 
 
Table 11 contains results for price events. The most important finding is the coefficients on 
dummy variable UND which are negative for winners and positive for losers in all periods. This 
finding, along with the return patterns documented in Table 7, supports the hypothesis that stock 
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prices reverse more when there is no accompanied public news. The coefficients on the event 
day abnormal return are mostly negative. Therefore, there is some evidence consistent with the 
overreaction hypothesis, which assumes that the greater overreaction would lead to the greater 
correction. But this effect mainly holds for losers. Excess returns have a negative relationship 
with pre-event leakage and the coefficients are significant for losers. This suggests that higher 
degree of pre-event leakage is associated with more overreaction. 
 
In terms of firm characteristics, the coefficients on the SIZE variable are negative for winners in 
all time period and positive for losers in the immediate period. Generally, the degree of 
overreaction is positively related to firm size. But for losers over longer periods, the smaller 
stocks experience greater reversals. The opposite effects of size on stock returns following good 
and bad news suggest that firm size is more than just a common risk factor in the cross section of 
stock returns. Further, I find that after controlling for public information and previous volume, 
there are still consistent relationships between excess return and abnormal trading volume. Post-
event abnormal return is positively associated with NAV. This result perhaps implies that 
abnormal volume activity conveys new information that is not captured by public news and 
liquidity. The coefficients on variable SD are negative for winners and mostly positive for losers. 
This indicates that market participants overreact more to both favorable and unfavorable 
information when firms are associated with higher degree of uncertainty. Previous stock return 
appears to be a key determinant of post-evet performance. The coefficients on AvgR variable are 
negative in all periods and mostly significant at 1 percent level, suggesting that unconditional 
stock returns tend to reverse for up to 20 days. Previous trading volume is another critical 
variable in explaining the magnitude of excess returns. The coefficients on AvgV variable are 
positive for winners in all periods and negative for losers over short horizons. This result 
suggests that the illiquid stocks experience more price reversals after positive and negative price 
shocks. However, in the case where the dependent variable is the abnormal return over day 6 
through 20, the coefficient for the losers is positive and significant which implies that losers with 
higher trading volume reverse more over longer term. 
 
Results from the estimation of equation (1) for volume events are presented in Table 12. The 
results in most explanatory variables are quite similar with those of price events. But the 
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equations have less significant explanatory power, as indicated by the adjusted R square and F-
statistics. The coefficients on dummy variable UND also confirm previous analysis that the 
degree of overreaction is stronger for extreme volume increases without public news release. 
Compared to price events, the coefficients are much more significant, suggesting that news 
disclosure is a more important determinant of price behavior for major volume movements. The 
coefficients on NAV are mostly positive for winners and negative for losers, suggesting that more 
extreme events (higher NAV) predict a higher degree of price continuation.  
 
Overall, the regression analysis presented above indicates that the availability of public 
information affects post-event returns. The news effects are more pronounced for volume events. 
 
6. Portfolio strategies 
Previous findings provide evidence that major price and volume shocks predict future excess 
returns. The different post-event return patterns between informed and uninformed events might 
allow investors to implement profitable strategies. Next, I test whether investors can profit from 
the portfolio strategies and assess the economic significance of the returns after taking into 
account transaction costs. 
 
Because previous results suggest that the predicted return patterns are more pronounced for 
losers, I focus on the sample of losers to assess whether investors can earn systematic profits 
from reacting to the large price and volume movements. Investors can detect the opportunity of 
trades based on the observation of stocks experiencing both abnormal price declines and trading 
volume increases. These two types of new information is public available. According to Karpoff 
(1987), the observations of simultaneous large volumes and large price changes may be traced to 
their common ties to information flow. Combing large price changes and high trading volume 
together can enhance the precision of the related signal and might improve the return 
predictability. 
 
To construct the sample, I follow the same methodology for identifying major price and volume 
movements as before. But for the portfolio strategy, I do not require only one event per day. 
There are 359 events during the whole sample period. Investors cannot accurately predict the 
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subsequent return patterns by observing price and volume shocks alone. they need to search for 
the availability of public news to decide the trading direction. Because previous findings show 
that the informed losers experience negative returns during the 20-day period following the event 
day while the uninform losers subsequently recover and show positive returns. I apply the 
trading strategy of short in informed losers and long in uninformed losers. The portfolio is 
equally-weighted. The returns of the portfolio can reflect the joint ability of extreme price 
changes, large trading volume and public news coverage to predict future returns. 
 
Since the anomalies in return and trading volume can only be detected after the stock market is 
closed, I assume that investors initiate trades at the beginning of the next day. They buy (sell) at 
the opening ask (bid) price of the day following the event, and sell (buy) at the closing bid (ask) 
price at the end of the holding period. This trading strategy allows me to assess the real 
profitability after taking account for the bid-ask spread. I also estimate the theoretical gain 
obtained in the absence of market frictions for comparison
7
. The theoretical strategy assumes that 
the investors initiate the trade at the end of the event day and trade at closing prices. This 
strategy is not feasible since it requires investors to trade at the moment when the abnormal 
return and volume are not necessarily known and does not reflect the bid-ask spread costs 
embedded in the round-trip trades. Since previous results show that excess returns tend to persist 
for 20 days after the event, I examine the trading strategies of several holding periods up to 20 
days. The portfolio returns are compared to the returns earned by a replicating market index 
portfolio. If the price patterns from previous findings are sufficiently strong, the profits from 
theoretical strategy would be positive. But if stock market is efficient, stock price should adjust 
to its full informative value at the time the large price and volume shock happens and the returns 
from feasible strategy would be negative, implying that the gains from the predicted price pattern 
is less than the transaction coasts of trading. 
 
Table 13 shows the results obtained by both feasible and theoretical strategies for various 
holding periods. The results show that the portfolio is profitable over all holding periods. The 
long strategies in uninformed losers earn much higher and more significant raw and market 
adjusted returns than the short strategies in informed losers. This finding suggests that the price 
                                                        
7 This method is also used by Bajo (2010). 
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reversals following uninformed events are more profound than the drifts after informed events. 
Both long and short strategies earn most over short holding periods. Combining the two 
strategies together, investors can earn a raw daily return of 2.753% and a market adjusted daily 
return of 3.612% after the bid-ask spread cost over a 3-day holding period, and both returns are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Even though the returns of the feasible strategy are 
smaller than those of the comparing theoretical portfolio, the transaction costs and the different 
trading time cannot make the gains vanish.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that the difference of post-event performance between informed and 
uninformed events is economically meaningful for losers. The existence of this profitable trading 
strategy is inconsistent with stock prices fully and quickly reflecting relevant information and 
apparently violates the efficient markets hypothesis. Among the literatures which deal with the 
profitability of trading on short-term price patterns induced by large price or volume movements, 
most find that no abnormal returns could be obtained (e.g., Benou & Richie, 2003; Chan, 2003; 
Ma et al., 2005). However, some studies report significant profits. For example, Pritamani and 
Singal (2001) find that the trading strategy conditional on large price changes, high volume and 
public information yields annual profits of 12–18% after controlling for bid–ask spreads. Bajo 
(2010) also find statistically significant profits for the portfolio strategies trying to exploit the 
persistence of excess returns following large trading after considering transaction costs and the 
different trading timing. However, Amini et al. (2013) point out that those studies in favor of 
profitability fail to account for all costs associated with trading, including the price impact of 
trades and direct fees and taxes. In addition, the stability of the price patterns is questioned if the 
ever-changing nature of markets is taken into consideration. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, I study the short-term stock return predictability following three measures of new 
information: large one-day price movement, abnormal trading volume increase and release of 
public news. 
 
Focusing on common stocks trading on Toronto Stock Exchange during the period 2011-2014, I 
initially identify major price and volume shocks and examine the subsequent abnormal returns. I 
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find that in general, large one-day price changes signal the following poor performance, while 
unusual volume increases predict good performance in the near future. I also find that the 
magnitude and trend of the price patterns differ across industries. These price patterns mean that 
stock returns are to some extent predictable. Then, I investigate how public announcements 
affect stock return predictability following large price and trading volume movements. I divide 
the samples into informed and uninformed events base on the availability of contemporary public 
news. I find that for both price and volume shocks, informed events tend to experience more 
price continuations than uninformed events. For stocks with negative initial price changes, 
informed events lead to price drifts while uninformed events are followed by price reversals. 
Investors seem to underreact to news about fundamentals but overreact to other shocks that cause 
unusual stock prices changes and trading activities. And these stock return patterns are more 
pronounced in losers. The cross-sectional analysis tests whether the subsequent market reactions 
to price and volume shocks are related to the presence of public information while controlling for 
initial price change, firm size, pre-event information leakage, volatility of stock returns and past 
stock price and volume. The results confirm that public news availability determines post-evet 
performance, but mostly for volume shocks. Finally, focusing on the sample of losers, I test 
whether the trading rule trying to exploit different market responses to information and no-
information based price and volume shocks is profitable. I find that the portfolio profits are large 
enough to cover the transaction cost, reflecting a violation of weak-form market efficiency 
 
Overall, the results from this paper indicate that much of the disagreement regarding the 
behavior of stock prices following large one-day movements in stock price or trading volume can 
be traced to the type of the events motivating the extreme shocks. The price patterns become 
more predictable after taking account of the availability of public news. 
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Table 1. Industries classification for the sample firms 
This table presents the industry distribution of the sample firms. The classification of the industries is based on The North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS). 
Industry Number Industry Number 
Mining 62 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 8 




Administrative and Support and Waste 
Management and Remediation Services 
3 
Real Estate Rental 
and Leasing 
27 Health Care and Social Assistance 2 
Information 24 Other Services (except Public Administration) 2 
Retail Trade 23 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 1 
Utilities 14 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 1 
Transportation and 
Warehousing 
14 Health Care and Social Assistance 1 
Wholesale Trade 9 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 1 
Construction 8 Health Care and Social Assistance 1 
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Table 2. Number of events in each year 
This table presents the time-series distribution of events. The TSX common stocks that experience one-day large price and 
volume movements are selected over the sample period of January 2011 through November 2014. A return event is defined if 
market adjusted abnormal return is more than three standard deviations away from the mean over the preceding 200 days (-205,-
6) for that stock. A volume event is defined if the daily trading volume is more than three standard deviations away from its 
mean volume of the preceding 66 days. The closing prices of the stock must be at least $10. All stocks must trade on the event 
day and the following 20 trading days. Stocks traded less than 180 days over the benchmark period (-205, -6) are eliminated. 
There must be no large price or volume movement over the preceding 20 trading days of the event. Winners and losers 
subsamples are classified based on the direction of the price change on the event day. Informed and uninformed events are 
classified based on whether they are accompanied by contemporary news disclosure. In each subsample, all firms that meet the 
above criteria are ranked alphabetically for each trading day and the only the first firms are selected.  
Events 
 
Price Events Volume Events 
Year Sample All Informed Uninformed All Informed Uninformed 
2011 Winners 162 72 90 149 48 101 
 
Losers 115 53 62 164 59 105 
 
All 277 125 152 313 107 206 
2012 Winners 113 65 48 157 48 109 
 
Losers 102 57 45 167 70 97 
 
All 215 122 93 324 118 206 
2013 Winners 152 88 64 178 67 111 
 
Losers 129 67 62 164 48 116 
 
All 281 155 126 342 115 227 
2014 Winners 144 73 71 164 61 103 
 
Losers 109 56 53 141 51 90 
 
All 253 129 124 305 112 193 
Total Winners 571 298 273 648 224 424 
 
Losers 455 233 222 636 228 408 
 
All 1026 531 495 1284 452 832 
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Table 3. Sample characteristics 
This table summarizes the characteristics for each subsample. Winners and losers subsamples are classified based on the 
direction of the price change on the event day. Informed and uninformed events are classified based on whether they are 
accompanied by contemporary news disclosure. Mean value for each variable is reported. R0 denotes the raw return on day 0. 
AR0 denotes the abnormal return on day 0. PRICE denotes the closing stock price for firms i six trading days before day 0. 
SIZE denotes the percentile ranking of firm i based on the firm’s market value of equity calculated six days before Day 0. AvgV 
denotes the average daily turnover of firm i over previous 66 trading days of Day 0. NAV denotes the normalized abnormal 
volume on day 0. SD denotes the standard deviation of firm i’s returns over trading days 205 through 6 before Day 0. BETA 
denotes market model beta estimated from 205 to 6 trading days before Day 0. AvgR denotes the average of firm i’s returns 
over trading days 205 through 6 before Day 0. 
Panel A. Price Events 
Samples 
 
Number 𝑅0(%) 𝐴𝑅0(%) PRICE SIZE Avg V(%) NAV SD(%) BETA Avg R(%) 
Winners All 571 6.295 6.295 35.794 0.818 0.203 3.820 1.516 0.695 0.054 
 
Informed 298 7.20 7.104 39.219 0.836 0.214 5.753 1.552 0.694 0.054 
 
Uninformed 273 5.308 5.226 32.054 0.799 0.19 1.709 1.477 0.696 0.053 
Losers All 455 -7.252 -7.252 38.437 0.837 0.217 3.456 1.51 0.716 0.065 
 
Informed 233 -8.204 -8.196 38.771 0.858 0.23 3.803 1.534 0.751 0.057 
 
Uninformed 222 -6.253 -6.161 38.086 0.815 0.202 3.091 1.484 0.679 0.073 
Panel B. Volume Events 
Samples 
 
Number 𝑅0(%) 𝐴𝑅0(%) PRICE SIZE Avg V(%) NAV SD(%) BETA Avg R(%) 
Winners All 648 2.799 2.735 34.965 0.822 0.190 6.322 1.587 0.681 0.051 
 
Informed 224 4.587 4.533 35.906 0.842 0.204 6.92 1.622 0.731 0.055 
 
Uninformed 424 1.855 1.785 34.469 0.812 0.183 6.006 1.569 0.654 0.049 
Losers All 636 -2.334 -2.395 36.351 0.823 0.191 6.54 1.545 0.659 0.061 
 
Informed 228 -3.494 -3.596 38.09 0.837 0.224 6.402 1.586 0.691 0.059 
 
Uninformed 408 -1.686 -1.724 35.38 0.815 0.173 6.617 1.521 0.642 0.062 
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Table 4. Abnormal returns for price events 
This table presents the average daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the sample of price events. Day 0 is 
the day of the event when the large abnormal price movements occur. Winners (Losers) are the subsamples where the day 0 
stock returns are positive (negative). Stock return is calculated based on the mid-point of closing bid-ask prices adjusted for 
dividends. Abnormal return is calculated as a firm’s daily return in excess of its return predicted by market model. Market 
model parameters are estimated from 205 through 6 trading days prior to the event day. Average abnormal return is calculated 
as the sum of the individual stock abnormal returns for that day divided by the number of observations. Cumulative abnormal 
return is formed by summing daily abnormal returns. Results are reported for various periods up to 20 days following an event. 
The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
Sample Winners Losers 









Proportion of Positive 
Abnormal Returns 
-3 -0.084 0.466* -0.004 0.501 
-2 0.006 0.483 -0.067 0.462* 
-1 0.135** 0.541** -0.293*** 0.429*** 
0 6.206*** 1*** -7.203*** 0*** 
1 -0.105 0.478 -0.265** 0.431*** 
2 0.048 0.487 0.04 0.473 
3 -0.146* 0.445*** 0.025 0.495 
4 0.166*** 0.511 0.049 0.497 










Proportion of Positive 
Abnormal Returns 
(-3,-1) 0.057 0.515 -0.365*** 0.448** 
(1,2) -0.056 0.489 -0.226 0.459** 
(1,3) -0.203 0.485 -0.201 0.464* 
(1,5) -0.006 0.511 -0.234 0.481 
(6,20) -0.554* 0.483 0.054 0.477 
(1,20) -0.56 0.475 -0.181 0.49 
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Table 5. Abnormal returns for volume events 
This table presents the average daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the sample of volume events. Day 0 
is the day of the event when the large abnormal volume movements occur. Winners (Losers) are the subsamples where the day 0 
stock returns are positive (negative). Stock return is calculated based on the mid-point of closing bid-ask prices adjusted for 
dividends. Abnormal return is calculated as a firm’s daily return in excess of its return predicted by market model. Market 
model parameters are estimated from 205 through 6 trading days prior to the event day. Average abnormal return is calculated 
as the sum of the individual stock abnormal returns for that day divided by the number of observations. Cumulative abnormal 
return is formed by summing daily abnormal returns. Results are reported for various periods up to 20 days following an event. 
The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
Sample Winners Losers 








Proportion of Positive 
Abnormal Returns 
-3 -0.172* 0.457** -0.099* 0.458** 
-2 0.038 0.477 -0.119** 0.454** 
-1 0.086* 0.48 -0.174** 0.461** 
0 2.735*** 1*** -2.395*** 0*** 
1 0.207*** 0.532** -0.062 0.5 
2 0.103** 0.503 0.086 0.458** 
3 0.112** 0.502 -0.1 0.462** 
4 -0.037 0.486 0.011 0.502 










Proportion of Positive 
Abnormal Returns 
(-3,-1) -0.047 0.511 -0.392*** 0.454** 
(1,2) 0.31*** 0.514 0.024 0.487 
(1,3) 0.422*** 0.522 -0.076 0.491 
(1,5) 0.331** 0.511 0.006 0.503 
(6,20) 0.111 0.485 0.005 0.489 
(1,20) 0.442* 0.528* 0.01 0.502 
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Table 6. Abnormal returns by industry classification 
This table presents the average daily abnormal returns for the subsamples of three different industries: mining, finance and 
insurance, and manufacturing. Day 0 is the day of the event when the large abnormal price or volume movements occur. 
Winners (Losers) are the subsamples where the day 0 stock returns are positive (negative). Stock return is calculated based on 
the mid-point of closing bid-ask prices adjusted for dividends. Abnormal return is calculated as a firm’s daily return in excess of 
its return predicted by market model. Market model parameters are estimated from 205 through 6 trading days prior to the event 
day. Average abnormal return is calculated as the sum of the individual stock abnormal returns for that day divided by the 
number of observations. Cumulative abnormal return is formed by summing daily abnormal returns. Results are reported for 
various periods up to 20 days following an event. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels. 
 
Panel A. Price Events 
Events Positive Negative 
Industry Mining Finance and Insurance Manufacturing Mining Finance and Insurance Manufacturing 
Sample Size 91 45 101 62 52 67 
Event Window Mean Abnormal Return (%) Mean Abnormal Return (%) 
-3 -0.269 0.122 -0.075 0.305* -0.059 0.078 
-2 -0.059 -0.087 -0.079 -0.355 -0.071 -0.046 
-1 0.055 -0.035 0.153 -0.727*** -0.128 -0.388 
0 7.564*** 4.196*** 7.531*** -6.448*** -4.45*** -9.12*** 
1 -0.13 -0.269 -0.137 -0.05 -0.041 -0.501 
2 -0.11 0.118 0.161 0.153 0.12 0.395* 
3 -0.066 -0.005 -0.189 0.24 0.049 0.074 
4 -0.129 0.003 0.378** -0.084 0.077 0.249 
5 0.251 -0.151 -0.121 -0.453* -0.14 -0.31 
(-3,-1) -0.274 0.001 -0.002 -0.777** -0.258 -0.356 
(1,3) -0.305 -0.156 -0.165 0.342 0.128 -0.032 
(1,5) -0.184 -0.304 0.092 -0.195 0.065 -0.094 
(6,20) -0.939 0.354 -1.286 0.134 -0.785 0.755 
(1,20) -1.122 0.05 -1.194 -0.062 -0.72 0.661 
Panel B. Volume Events 
Events Positive Negative 
Industry Mining Finance and Insurance Manufacturing Mining Finance and Insurance Manufacturing 
Sample Size 86 71 83 69 79 91 
Event Window Mean Abnormal Return (%) Mean Abnormal Return (%) 
-3 -1.005* 0.307 -0.215 -0.065 0.051 -0.157 
-2 0.021 0.112** -0.118 -0.349 -0.257** -0.326** 
-1 0.012 0.167** 0.18 -0.359 -0.423** -0.175 
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0 4.606*** 2.022*** 2.902*** -3.302*** -1.726*** -3.281*** 
1 -0.25 0.094** 0.168 0.129 0.303** -0.167 
2 0.073 0.113 0.081 -0.064 0.064 0.198 
3 0.312* 0.285 0.053 -0.255 0.065 -0.015 
4 -0.314 -0.135 0.026 0.293 -0.135 0.251 
5 -0.318 0.062 0.09 0.28 -0.108 -0.14 
(-3,-1) -0.972 0.585** -0.153 -0.774 -0.63** -0.657* 
(1,3) 0.136 0.491** 0.302 -0.391 0.432** 0.017 
(1,5) -0.496 0.418 0.418 0.182 0.188 0.127 
(6,20) -0.839 0.65 0.611 -0.169 -0.152 1.051 
(1,20) -1.335 1.068 1.028* 0.013* 0.036 1.179 
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Table 7. Abnormal return differences between informed and uninformed return events 
This table presents the average daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the subsamples of informed and 
uninformed price events. Informed and uninformed events are classified based on whether they are accompanied by 
contemporary news disclosure. Day 0 is the day of the event when the large abnormal price movements occur. Winners (Losers) 
are the subsamples where the day 0 stock returns are positive (negative). Stock return is calculated based on the mid-point of 
closing bid-ask prices adjusted for dividends. Abnormal return is calculated as a firm’s daily return in excess of its return 
predicted by market model. Market model parameters are estimated from 205 through 6 trading days prior to the event day. 
Average abnormal return is calculated as the sum of the individual stock abnormal returns for that day divided by the number of 
observations. Cumulative abnormal return is formed by summing daily abnormal returns. Results are reported for various 
periods up to 20 days following an event. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. 
Panel A. Winners 
Public News Informed Events Uninformed Events 
 














Mean Difference (%) 
-3 0.069 0.513 -0.251*** 0.414*** 0.32*** 
-2 0.012 0.48 -0.001 0.487 0.013 
-1 0.182** 0.54* 0.083 0.542* 0.099 
0 7.104*** 1*** 5.226*** 1*** 1.878*** 
1 -0.022 0.51 -0.196 0.443** 0.174 
2 0.105 0.49 -0.014 0.484 0.119 
3 -0.12 0.45** -0.175 0.44** 0.054 
4 0.259*** 0.507 0.064 0.516 0.196 















Mean Difference (%) 
(1,2) 0.084 0.523 -0.209 0.451* 0.293 
(1,3) -0.037 0.5 -0.384* 0.469 0.347 




(6,20) -0.577 0.477 -0.529 0.491 -0.048 
(1,20) -0.372 0.48 -0.766 0.469 0.395 
Panel B. Losers 
Public News Informed Events Uninformed Events 
 














Mean Difference (%) 
-3 0.063 0.519 -0.074 0.482 0.137 
-2 -0.09 0.455* -0.044 0.468 -0.045 
-1 -0.176* 0.455* -0.417*** 0.401*** 0.241 
0 -8.196*** 0*** -6.161*** 0*** -2.035** 
1 -0.445** 0.395*** -0.077 0.468 -0.368 
2 -0.022 0.481 0.104 0.464 -0.126 
3 -0.023 0.476 0.076 0.514 -0.099 
4 0.0008 0.489 0.099 0.505 -0.098 















Mean Difference (%) 
(1,2) -0.467** 0.429** 0.027 0.491 -0.494 
(1,3) -0.49** 0.442** 0.103 0.486 -0.593* 
(1,5) -0.664 0.433** 0.217 0.532 -0.881** 
(6,20) 0.268 0.468 -0.172 0.486 0.44 
(1,20) -0.396 0.446* 0.045 0.536 -0.442 
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Table 8. Abnormal return differences between informed and uninformed volume events 
This table presents the average daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the subsamples of informed and 
uninformed volume events. Informed and uninformed events are classified based on whether they are accompanied by 
contemporary news disclosure. Day 0 is the day of the event when the large abnormal volume movements occur. Winners 
(Losers) are the subsamples where the day 0 stock returns are positive (negative). Stock return is calculated based on the mid-
point of closing bid-ask prices adjusted for dividends. Abnormal return is calculated as a firm’s daily return in excess of its 
return predicted by market model. Market model parameters are estimated from 205 through 6 trading days prior to the event 
day. Average abnormal return is calculated as the sum of the individual stock abnormal returns for that day divided by the 
number of observations. Cumulative abnormal return is formed by summing daily abnormal returns. Results are reported for 
various periods up to 20 days following an event. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels. 
 
Panel A. Winners 
Public News Informed Events Uninformed Events 
 














Mean Difference (%) 
-3 -0.059 0.469 -0.232* 0.45** 0.172 
-2 -0.018 0.469 0.068 0.481 -0.087 
-1 0.012 0.487 0.126* 0.476 -0.113 
0 4.533*** 1*** 1.785*** 1*** 2.747*** 
1 0.569*** 0.594*** 0.015 0.5 0.553*** 
2 0.181* 0.527 0.062 0.491 0.119 
3 0.086 0.487 0.126** 0.509 -0.04 
4 -0.082 0.464 -0.014 0.498 -0.068 















Mean Difference (%) 
(1,2) 0.75*** 0.576** 0.077 0.481 0.673*** 
(1,3) 0.836*** 0.554* 0.203* 0.505 0.633** 
(1,5) 0.695*** 0.549* 0.139 0.491 0.556* 
(6,20) 0.432 0.545* -0.058 0.453** 0.49 
(1,20) 1.127** 0.58*** 0.081 0.5 1.046* 
Panel B. Losers 
Public News Informed Events Uninformed Events 
 
















Mean Difference (%) 
-3 -0.162* 0.461 -0.063 0.456** -0.1 
-2 -0.112 0.469 -0.124* 0.446** 0.011 
-1 -0.205 0.443** -0.157* 0.471 -0.048 
0 -3.596*** 0*** -1.724*** 0*** -1.872*** 
1 -0.114 0.461 -0.033 0.522 -0.082 
2 -0.14 0.425** 0.213 0.475 -0.353 
3 -0.306*** 0.417*** 0.015 0.488 -0.321** 
4 0.064 0.496 -0.019 0.505 0.083 















Mean Difference (%) 
(1,2) -0.255 0.447* 0.18 0.51 -0.434* 
(1,3) -0.561** 0.425** 0.195* 0.527 -0.756*** 
(1,5) -0.454* 0.465 0.263 0.525 -0.717** 
(6,20) -0.291 0.478 0.17 0.495 -0.46 
(1,20) -0.745 0.452* 0.432 0.529 -1.177* 
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Table 9. Abnormal return differences between informed and uninformed price events, using a broader 
definition of news 
This table presents the average daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the subsamples of informed and 
uninformed price events. Informed events are defined as those accompanied by contemporary firm-specific or macroeconomic 
news disclosure. Day 0 is the day of the event when the large abnormal price movements occur. Winners (Losers) are the 
subsamples where the day 0 stock returns are positive (negative). Stock return is calculated based on the mid-point of closing 
bid-ask prices adjusted for dividends. Abnormal return is calculated as a firm’s daily return in excess of its return predicted by 
market model. Market model parameters are estimated from 205 through 6 trading days prior to the event day. Average 
abnormal return is calculated as the sum of the individual stock abnormal returns for that day divided by the number of 
observations. Cumulative abnormal return is formed by summing daily abnormal returns. Results are reported for various 
periods up to 20 days following an event. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. 
Panel A. Winners 
Public News Informed Events Uninformed Events 
 















-3 0.025 0.519 -0.242** 0.388*** 0.267** 
-2 -0.021 0.469 0.046 0.504 -0.067 
-1 0.156** 0.534 0.103 0.552* 0.053 
0 6.812*** 1*** 5.322*** 1*** 1.49 
1 -0.096 0.501 -0.118 0.444** 0.023 
2 0.096 0.484 -0.022 0.491 0.118 
3 -0.15 0.434*** -0.141 0.461 -0.009 
4 0.223*** 0.516 0.083 0.504 0.14 














(1,2) 0.001 0.507 -0.14 0.461 0.141 
(1,3) -0.149 0.49 -0.281 0.478 0.132 




(6,20) -0.659* 0.469 -0.402 0.504 -0.257 
(1,20) -0.573 0.466 -0.542 0.487 -0.031 
Panel B. Losers 
Public News Informed Events Uninformed Events 
 















-3 0.019 0.515 -0.037 0.481 0.056 
-2 -0.017 0.474 -0.139 0.444* 0.122 
-1 -0.215** 0.451* -0.406*** 0.396*** 0.191 
0 -7.66*** 0*** -6.548*** 0*** -1.112 
1 -0.418** 0.396*** -0.046 0.481 -0.372 
2 -0.004 0.485 0.102 0.455 -0.105 
3 0.003 0.496 0.056 0.492 -0.052 
4 0.028 0.489 0.078 0.508 -0.05 














(1,2) -0.422** 0.429** 0.055 0.503 -0.477 
(1,3) -0.418* 0.451* 0.111 0.481 -0.529 
(1,5) -0.551** 0.44** 0.219 0.54 -0.769* 
(6,20) 0.1 0.459* -0.012 0.503 0.112 
(1,20) -0.451 0.455* 0.206 0.54 -0.657 
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Table 10. Abnormal return differences between informed and uninformed volume events, using a 
broader definition of news 
This table presents the average daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the subsamples of informed and 
uninformed volume events. Informed events are defined as those accompanied by contemporary firm-specific or 
macroeconomic news disclosure. Day 0 is the day of the event when the large abnormal volume movements occur. Winners 
(Losers) are the subsamples where the day 0 stock returns are positive (negative). Stock return is calculated based on the mid-
point of closing bid-ask prices adjusted for dividends. Abnormal return is calculated as a firm’s daily return in excess of its 
return predicted by market model. Market model parameters are estimated from 205 through 6 trading days prior to the event 
day. Average abnormal return is calculated as the sum of the individual stock abnormal returns for that day divided by the 
number of observations. Cumulative abnormal return is formed by summing daily abnormal returns. Results are reported for 
various periods up to 20 days following an event. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels. 
 
Panel A. Winners 
Public News Informed Events Uninformed Events 
 















-3 -0.127 0.452* -0.207 0.46* 0.08 
-2 0.022 0.47 0.051 0.482 -0.03 
-1 -0.015 0.481 0.165** 0.479 -0.18 
0 4.036*** 1*** 1.727*** 1*** 2.309*** 
1 0.416*** 0.569** 0.044 0.504 0.372** 
2 0.138* 0.498 0.076 0.507 0.062 
3 0.058 0.488 0.154** 0.512 -0.096 
4 -0.084 0.484 -0.001 0.488 -0.083 














(1,2) 0.554*** 0.548* 0.121 0.488 0.433* 
(1,3) 0.612*** 0.534 0.274** 0.512 0.337 
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(1,5) 0.451** 0.537 0.239 0.49 0.212 
(6,20) 0.319 0.516 -0.051 0.46* 0.37 
(1,20) 0.77** 0.548* 0.188 0.512 0.582 
Panel B. Losers 
Public News Informed Events Uninformed Events 
 















-3 -0.12 0.474 -0.079 0.443** -0.041 
-2 -0.043 0.49 -0.188** 0.422*** 0.145 
-1 -0.122 0.467 -0.22** 0.455* 0.098 
0 -3.168*** 0*** -1.696*** 0*** -1.472*** 
1 -0.05 0.477 -0.073 0.521 0.023 
2 -0.091 0.434** 0.246 0.479 -0.337 
3 -0.23** 0.437** 0.018 0.485 -0.248* 
4 0.107 0.51 -0.076 0.494 0.183 














(1,3) -0.371* 0.45** 0.191 0.527 -0.562** 
(1,5) -0.296 0.483 0.278 0.521 -0.574* 
(6,20) -0.222 0.48 0.21 0.497 -0.432 
(1,20) -0.518 0.467 0.488 0.533 -1.006 
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Table 11. Regression results for price events 
This table reports coefficients estimates of the following regression: 
CARi(m,n) = β0 + β1UNDi + β2AR0i + β3 SIZEi + β4 LEAKi + β5 NAVi + β6 SDi + β7 AvgRi + β8AvgVi + β9MON + β10JAN + β11DEC + ε 
Variables are defined as follows: 
CARi(m,n) = the cumulative abnormal return for firm i over a period starting m and ending n trading days after the event day; 
UNDi = a dummy variable equals to one if no news is published for firm I on the event day or one day before, and zero otherwise; 
AR0i = the abnormal return for firm i on the event day; 
SIZEi = the percentile ranking of firm i based on the firm’s market value of equity calculated six days before the event day; 
LEAKi = the abnormal return for firm i on the day before the event day; 
NAVi = the normalized abnormal volume for firm i on the event day; 
SDi = the standard deviation of firm i’s returns over trading days 205 through 6 before the event day;  
AvgRi = the average of firm i’s returns over trading days 205 through 6 before the event day;  
AvgVi =  the average daily turnover of firm i over previous 66 trading days of the event; 
MON = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the event occurred on Monday, and zero otherwise; 
JAN = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the event occurred in January, and zero otherwise; 
DEC = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the event occurred in December, and zero otherwise. 
The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
Panel A. Winners 
CAR Intercept UND 𝐴𝑅0 SIZE LEAK NAV SD AvgR AvgV MON JAN DEC Adj 𝑅
2 F statistic 
(1,2) 0.006 -0.0025 0.0022 -0.0029 -0.1373* 0.00005 -0.6416*** -3.9263*** 3.904*** 0.0023 0.0047 -0.0007 0.059 4.25*** 
(1,3) 0.0101 -0.0037 -0.0603 -0.0101 -0.0869 0.0002*** -0.3206 -4.0902*** 3.5542*** 0.0033 0.005 -0.0021 0.04 3.164*** 
(1,5) 0.0226* -0.0045 -0.0381 -0.0213 -0.1415 0.0003*** -0.4277 -6.5493*** 3.6004** 0.0056 0.0066 -0.0059 0.059 4.24*** 
(6,20) 0.0514** -0.001 0.0452 -0.0406* 0.2198 -0.0001 -1.202** -18.0572*** 1.6935 -0.0028 -0.012 -0.0043 0.092 6.226*** 
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(1,20) 0.074*** -0.0055 0.0071 -0.0618** 0.0783 0.0002 -1.6296** -24.6065*** 5.2939* 0.0028 -0.0055 -0.0102 0.125 8.405*** 
Panel B. Losers 
CAR Intercept UND 𝐴𝑅0 SIZE LEAK NAV SD AvgR AvgV MON JAN DEC Adj 𝑅
2 F statistic 
(1,2) -0.0242** 0.005 -0.0053 0.0183 -0.1488 0.0001 0.5162* -2.1297 -2.0161 0.0059 0.0014 0.0027 0.012 1.501 
(1,3) -0.0209* 0.0051 -0.0026 0.0184 -0.3371*** 0.0001 0.5363* -4.018*** -3.5916** 0.0084* 0.0047 0.0077 0.037 2.577*** 
(1,5) -0.0169 0.0088** 0.0003 0.0163 -0.3544*** 0.0002 0.2389 -6.0336*** -2.5632 0.0051 -0.0037 0.0041 0.037 2.583*** 
(6,20) 0.0232 0.0019 -0.0869** -0.0396* -0.0588 0.0001 -0.0805 -21.8175*** 8.539*** -0.0037 0.0026 0.0017 0.17 9.446*** 
(1,20) 0.0063 0.0107 -0.0867** -0.0232 -0.4132* 0.0003 0.1584 -27.8511*** 5.9759* 0.0014 -0.0011 0.0058 0.162 8.979*** 
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Table 12. Regression results for volume events 
This table reports coefficients estimates of the following regression: 
CARi(m,n) = β0 + β1UNDi + β2AR0i + β3 SIZEi + β4 LEAKi + β5 NAVi + β6 SDi + β7 AvgRi + β8AvgVi + β9MON + β10JAN + β11DEC + ε 
Variables are defined as follows: 
CARi(m,n) = the cumulative abnormal return for firm i over a period starting m and ending n trading days after the event day; 
UNDi = a dummy variable equals to one if no news is published for firm I on the event day or one day before, and zero otherwise; 
AR0i = the abnormal return for firm i on the event day; 
SIZEi = the percentile ranking of firm i based on the firm’s market value of equity calculated six days before the event day; 
LEAKi = the abnormal return for firm i on the day before the event day; 
NAVi = the normalized abnormal volume for firm i on the event day; 
SDi = the standard deviation of firm i’s returns over trading days 205 through 6 before the event day;  
AvgRi = the average of firm i’s returns over trading days 205 through 6 before the event day;  
AvgVi =  the average daily turnover of firm i over previous 66 trading days of the event; 
MON = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the event occurred on Monday, and zero otherwise; 
JAN = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the event occurred in January, and zero otherwise; 
DEC = a dummy variable equals to 1 if the event occurred in December, and zero otherwise. 
The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
Panel A. Winners 
CAR Intercept UND 𝐴𝑅0 SIZE LEAK NAV SD AvgR AvgV MON JAN DEC Adj 𝑅
2 F statistic 
(1,2) 0.0264*** -0.0068*** 0.012 -0.0261*** -0.0805 0.00004 0.1981 -2.6061*** 0.4962 -0.0019 -0.0029 -0.0033 0.036 3.172*** 
(1,3) 0.0285*** -0.0077*** -0.0376 -0.0268*** -0.0784 0.0001 0.3151* -3.3375*** 0.2729 -0.0039 -0.0013 -0.0024 0.034 3.082*** 
(1,5) 0.0488*** -0.0072** -0.0084 -0.0442*** -0.0599 0.0001 -0.0298 -5.3592*** -0.2774 -0.0048 0.0009 -0.0057 0.043 3.628*** 
(6,20) 0.0447*** -0.0062 0.0222 -0.0448** -0.1323 -0.0005 0.4951 -10.9383*** -1.2545 0.0034 -0.0074 0.0106 0.055 4.418*** 
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 (1,20) 0.0936*** -0.0134** 0.0137 -0.089*** -0.1922 -0.0005 0.4654 -16.2975*** -1.5319 -0.0014 -0.0065 0.0049 0.094 7.114*** 
Panel B. Losers 
CAR Intercept UND 𝐴𝑅0 SIZE LEAK NAV SD AvgR AvgV MON JAN DEC Adj 𝑅
2 F statistic 
(1,2) -0.0055 0.0039 -0.0132 0.0058 0.0042 -0.0002 0.2997* -1.2596 -2.7253** -0.0022 0.0022 0.0123** 0.016 1.924*** 
(1,3) -0.0017 0.0069** -0.0172 0.0024 -0.0106 -0.0002 0.1597 -2.2987** -3.3285*** -0.004 0.0011 0.0186*** 0.042 3.546*** 
(1,5) -0.0035 0.0076** -0.0325 0.0011 -0.0193 -0.0002 0.2585 -4.0254*** -2.118 -0.0037 0.0001 0.0247*** 0.036 3.148*** 
(6,20) 0.0274 0.01* -0.2383** -0.0435** -0.1762 0.00001 -0.1139 -16.0735*** 3.7204 0.0018 0.0093 -0.0141 0.076 5.768*** 
(1,20) 0.0239 0.0176*** -0.2708*** -0.0424* -0.1955 -0.0002 0.1446 -20.0989*** 1.6024 -0.0019 0.0094 0.0106 0.096 7.148*** 
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Table 13. Portfolio strategy 
This table reports the profits earned by portfolios of stocks experiencing both large price declines and abnormal volume increases on one day among the 
period beginning of January, 2011 to the end of November, 2014. Raw returns and market adjusted returns obtained by both feasible and theoretical 
strategies for various holding periods are presented. The trading strategy is short in informed losers and long in uninformed losers. The portfolio is 
equally-weighted. The feasible strategies assume that investors buy (sell) at the opening ask (bid) price of the day following the event, and sell (buy) at 
the closing bid (ask) price at the end of the holding period. The theoretical strategies assume that the investors initiate the trade at the end of the event day 
and trade at closing prices. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
Holding Period Portfolio Feasible Strategy Theoretical Strategy 
  
Raw Returns (%) Market Adjusted Returns (%) Raw Returns (%) Market Adjusted Returns (%) 
(1,2) Whole 1.675* 1.6* 2.661*** 3.902*** 
 
Informed 1.119 1.058 2.658** 2.597** 
 
Uninformed 2.621* 2.521* 6.221** 6.12** 
(1,3) Whole 2.753*** 2.661*** 3.612*** 3.52*** 
 
Informed 1.228 1.17 1.973** 1.914* 
 
Uninformed 5.344*** 5.194*** 6.399*** 6.249*** 
(1,5) Whole 1.919*** 1.859** 2.515*** 2.455*** 
 
Informed 1.067 1.05 1.479* 1.462* 
 
Uninformed 3.367*** 3.234*** 4.275*** 4.142*** 
(1,20) Whole 0.437** 0.376** 0.554*** 0.493** 
 
Informed 0.095 0.056 0.182 0.143 
 
Uninformed 1.02*** 0.921*** 1.187*** 1.088*** 
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Distributions of Events by Month 
Number of Price Events
Number of Volume Events
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